This study analyzes an imposition of government R&D investment subsidy in the standard model of vertical product differentiation with two products in a duopolistic competition. We show that the imposition of distinct subsidy to low quality firm increases its profit, but decreases the high quality firm's profits, whereas subsidy to high quality firm increases both firms' profits. It can be concluded that the subsidization effects of government are socially beneficial whether it is uniform or distinct R&D subsidy policies. Therefore, it can be suggested to the emerging economies that industrial transformation and enhancement of social welfare are possible at a given period of time through the best adoption of moderate R&D investments subsidy in the firms under vertical product differentiation setting. JEL Classification: G18, L11, L15.
findings that have emerged from theoretical studies of R&D subsidy and patenting at the firm level.
In series of works, governments in this world may have strong interests in a strategicuse of their R&D policies that can help their domestic firms to capture a larger share of profits in domestic and the international markets. These R&D policies are strategic in the sense that they are designed to promote their quality in domestic market and affect foreign firms' behavior in order to improve domestic firms' positions in competition for the world market. There are many theoretical models addressing process R&D activities, but a few studies have analyzed the economic implications of product R&D activities under imperfect competition. Brander and Spencer (1985) analyzed the strategic R&D policy when two firms, each from a different country, play a two-stage game: firms simultaneously decide their R&D investment levels to reduce the production costs process R&D, then they compete with homogeneous or horizontally differentiated products by setting Cournot competition in a third country. They concluded that a government can reduce the foreign firm's R&D investment by subsidizing the domestic firm's R&D activities because the foreign firm will reduce its R&D activities in response to the increased R&D of the domestic firm. Bagwell and Staiger (1994) explore the robustness of this strategic R&D subsidy result against various assumptions about oligopolistic industries: different forms of competition, various types of uncertainty in R&D investments, and different numbers of firms. Their analysis shows that the negative externality of R&D activities and the negatively sloped investment reaction curves are still valid under various assumptions, thus implying the robustness of strategic R&D subsidy policy. White (1996) used a regulated mixed oligopoly model for a closed economy with a linear inverse demand function and an identical quadratic cost function across the firms where government imposes production subsidy while Phuyal (2014) examines welfare difference of product differentiated banking industries in a mixed market oligopolies.
Later, Zhou et al. (2002) have examined the implications of a 'strategic trade policy' targeted at investments in quality improvements of exported products. It is assumed in their model that the firm producing a higher quality product locates in a developed country and lower quality firm in less developed country, and that the two firms compete in a third country's market. Symeonidis (2003) pointed out that the product R&D directly affects the consumer's surplus, whereas process R&D affects it only indirectly. Toshimitsu (2003) have discussed the implications of subsidy / tax policies targeted at R&D investments to improve product qualities in the cases of Bertrand and Cournot duopoly. They have shown that the effects of R&D subsidies on qualities and quantities demanded depend on the firm's strategic relationship in the quality decision. Jinji and Toshimitsu (2006) analyze the case of asymmetric cost of product R&D with a small technology gap between firms. Although symmetric duopoly (Aoki and Prusa, 1997) and asymmetric duopoly with a large 338 © 2016 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved. technology gap (Zhou et al., 2002) have been examined, the intermediate case has received less attention, despite its relevance in the real world. Recently, Shin and Kim (2010) analyze the effect of government subsidy policies on creating an incentive for domestic firms to improve their product quality before exporting to an outside market. They simulate a dynamic profit maximization problem of the firm and derive the optimal path of the product quality development, then test the efficiency of the different types of subsidy methods.
In sum up, it has been studied that there are very limited papers closely related to the present study: Lahiri and Ono (1999) ; Zhou et al. (2002) and Toshimitsu (2003) . They all discuss the subsidy policies applied to R&D investments for quality improvements in concentrated industries using the standard VPD models where Bertrand product-market competition prevails. Toshimitsu (2003) has discussed the optimal R&D policy and its effects on qualities where quantities demanded depend on the firm's strategic relationship in the quality decision. Moreover, authors have presented R&D policies : (i) to maximize net consumer surplus; is to subsidize the two firms, if the government's burden of the subsidies is sufficiently small, (ii) to maximize net producer surplus; is to subsidize the higher quality firm and tax the lower quality firm with Bertrand competition. On the other hand, under Cournot competition, R&D taxation upon the two firms increases net producer surplus and (iii) under Bertrand competition, subsidizing the two firms is socially optimal. Under the Bertrand competition, Lee and Phuyal (2013) also contributed about how the limiting quality device of high-quality firm in regulatory mechanism of minimum quality standards of a product differentiated industry works effectively to enlarge the profits of the firms and entire social welfare in the economy.
Similarly, Zhou et al. (2002) have discussed the optimal R&D policy in the context of international rivalry. That context implies that the purpose of a government is to maximize the net profit of each country's firm. In other words, they mainly focused on the international distribution of profits in order to interpret the implications of a 'strategic trade policy'. In the same line, examined strategic research and development(R&D) policy for quality differentiated product in a third market trade model. They extended previous studies by including a third exporting firm/country in their model. Firms export their entire production to a fourth country. They have different R&D capabilities, but their R&D cost functions are identical as long as their products qualities are below their R&D capabilities. Contrary to earlier studies, authors find that the optimal strategic R&D policy is influenced by the nature of market competition only in the case of the high-quality exporter. The governments of the middle and low-quality exporter would respectively tax and subsidize their domestic firm's R&D under both price and quantity competition. If firms coordinate, the joint optimal R&D policies differ depending on the countries' coordination pairs and competition mode.
Ishii (2014) develops a theoretical third-country trade model of price competition with less stringent demand and cost functions. As opposed to his predecessor, Ishii (2014) finds that the optimal R&D policy does not necessarily depend only on the competition mode, given that in certain situations, both governments' optimal policy involves a product R&D subsidy even when firms compete in a Bertrand fashion. Finally, Taba (2016) derives non-cooperative and cooperative optimal product research and development (R&D) policies of a country with a high-quality firm and a country with a low-quality firm in the presence of technology spillover under Cournot and Bertrand competitions in an international duopoly. He shows that the non-cooperative optimal product R&D Policy is tax for a wider range of spillover effects under Cournot competition, compared to the case of Bertrand competition.
In the same spirit of the above theories and well exposed research papers, this study has made an attempt to analyze all the possible effects of R&D subsidy policies and examines the degree of quality differentiation, and derives the maximum social welfare level in both distinct and uniform R&D subsidy policy cases. This is one of the new approaches to discourse the government R&D investment under game theoretical framework. The model considers a three stage game in which firms compete in two stages and prior to firms' decision, government imposes © 2016 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved. quality improvement R&D subsidy to maximize social welfare and Bertrand price competition happens at the final stage.
The major findings of this paper are as follows. First, government R&D subsidy to lower quality firm increases the quantity demanded and market shares in which firms compete in qualities at the final stage. Second, we find that subsidy to higher quality firm increases both firms' profits.Third, this result exhibits a sharpcontrast to the outcome in the case where subsidy on both qualities improves social welfare. Fourth, imposition of uniform R&D subsidy policies always increases the firms' profits and social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two deals with basic frame work model. Section three derives benchmark equilibrium, section four consists with effects of R&D subsidy policy, and section five concludes the results.
THE BASIC MODEL
In an extension of the standard model of vertical product differentiation with R&D subsidy, this paper initially considers a domestic duopoly market of industrial countries where there are two identical firms which produce vertically differentiated goods for the domestic consumers. Later, this concept can be extended to more than one country case, too.
On the demand side of the study, it is assumed that there is a continuum of consumers indexed by θ, which is
with density one. Each consumer is supposed to buy at most one unit of the quality differentiated product produced by the firms.
The basic model of this study is taken from Choi and Shin (1992) followed by the original papers of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) which explains about an indirect utility function of a consumer given by;
If consumer buys one unit of a product of quality
His utility is zero if he buys nothing, his utility is explained as follows;
Similarly, a consumer will be willing to buy the product of any one of the firm, only if;
On the supply side of the model, the quality of each product is a consequence of R&D investment; however, this expenditure becomes a fixed cost in the production process so, quality ) ( i q c is a fixed cost which is quadratic in quality and written as;
Based on the established literatures on vertical product differentiation i.e. Shaked and Sutton (1982) ; Ronnen (1991); Aoki and Prusa (1997) ; Zhou et al. (2002) ; Toshimitsu (2003) this study assumes that firms face identical cost structure which depends on quality. Each firm engages in product R&D to improve product quality. The cost of  340 © 2016 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
quality improvement for producing quality i q is given byby
Throughout the analysis it shall also maintain the regularity in assumptions such that
Marginal cost of production is assumed to be constant and without loss of generality they are to be zero. Whereas government seeks to maximize social welfare and set the quality improvement subsidy ) (S to their domestic firms, prior to the game played by firms' i.e.
In this setting, firms compete in a two-stage game in which they simultaneously choose the quality of their products in the first stage, and they compete in prices at the specified markets in the second stage.
BENCHMARK: EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In a setting of duopolistic model of an imperfect competition market, initially two identical firms produce i q and
. It is considered that the market is ex ante assumed to be uncovered where the total quantity demanded to the high and low quality firms is supposed to be
For all , the consumer indifferences between buying the low quality and not buying any unit of the good in the market are;
For all , the consumer indifferences between buying one unit of the good of any firm is;
The demand and revenue functions of low and high quality firms are characterized as follows;
Whereas, the profit functions of the firms are expressed as follows;
At this stage, both firms choose price to maximize their profits (10) then, we have the following first order conditions;
Profit maximizing private firms result equilibrium prices in the second stage and they are obtained as follows from the first order condition;
Solving (12) and (13) Price functions;
With the equilibrium prices in the second stage, it has the corresponding demand and profits for the high-quality
and low-quality firms respectively;
Demand functions;
Many of the works including Aoki and Prusa (1997) ; Zhou et al. (2002) etc have shown the various properties of the revenue functions. In the same way, the different signs of the revenue functions in the first order differentiation from equation (8) The positive cross partial derivative shows that qualities are strategic complements.
Profit functions;
Let us assume that government of industrial countries impose R&D subsidy S (to firms i ), which is the portion of the cost of investments in quality and their profit functions i.e.
S q c R
While specifying them in two firms;
In the second stage, firms maximize (18) and (19) with respect to H q and L q respectively then, we obtain the best replies functions for the high-quality and low-quality firms in the first order conditionwhere; the quality ratio, which determines the degree of price competition. For low quality firm, since an increase in L q reduces the gap between the products keeping H q fixed and an associated increase in price competition tends to limit the gain from an increase in quality. Nevertheless, low quality firm has an incentive to set 0  L q for any H q because the assumptions 0 ) 0 ( ' ) 0 (   c c ensure that its marginal profit from a very low quality is always strictly positive. By contrast, the prospect of reduced price competition favors an increase in quality by high quality firm, but the extent of the increase is limited by rising marginal cost of investment in quality.
Since each firm's marginal revenue from own quality is increasing in the other firm's quality, the reaction functions 
GOVERNMENT R&D SUBSIDY POLICY
This section examines the effects of R&D subsidy policy in a duopolistic trading market where it explores the R&D behavior of the domestic firms under the given competition described earlier and investigates its effects on quality differentiation, and market shares with the aim of achieving maximum social welfare. It also seeks to extend the cases into optimal uniform R&D subsidy policy effect. The explanations of each of different cases are discussed briefly in the following sub-sections.
Imposition of Distinct R&D Subsidy Policy
The case when government imposes a distinct level of R&D subsidy ( 1 0    H L s s ) to both firms in an industry then, its possible effects on different sectors are examined as follows;
Effects of R&D Subsidy on Quality
First, this study examines the effect of government R&D subsidy on quality improvements of the firms. For that, dividing (18.1) by (19.1) the basic expression (20) 
Effects of R&D Subsidy on Market Shares
The market shares of firms are explained with adopting simple calculation methods. For the exact explanation of the results, the notations assumed here to define (18.2) 
Proposition 1:
The imposition of government R&D subsidies to firms increases both low and high qualities; in contrast, subsidies to high quality firm decreases the quantity demanded and market shares but subsidy to lower quality firm increases the quantity demand and market shares.
Effects of R&D Subsidy on Firms' Profits
It is obtained by substituting the optimal qualities of both firms. Using expressions (18.1) and (19.1) into their profit functions in expressions (18) and (19), the expression (22) and (23) are derived. 
It is seen that an increase the R&D subsidy of the lower quality firm reduces the higher quality firm's revenue.
But, increasing R&D subsidy of higher quality firm increases the revenues of both firms. This is because the higher quality firm has an incentive to raise its quality since maintaining quality differentiation prevents price competition from intensifying.
Effects of R&D Subsidy on Social Welfare
This subsection deals to show an effect of R&D policy to maximize social welfare function. The government imposed subsidy to the firms in order to maximize the social welfare and it is obtained by reducing the government subsidy from the sum of consumer's surplus and firms' profits given by;
Where, PS=producers' surplus and S=Subsidies ) 2 In expression (25), the direct effect of subsidy on welfare is zero but equilibrium outcomes is the form of subsidy obtained in (26) influences on firms' outcomes. Thus, the government ought to subsidize the both firms in order to promote the R&D investments to improve product qualities and maximize the social welfare.
Differentiating (26) on both sides with respect to L s & H s respectively, are written as follows; Hence, subsidizing both firms is socially optimal.
Proposition 2:Government's R&D subsidy to lower quality firm increases its own profit but decreases the high quality firm's profits whereas subsidy to higher quality firm increases both firms' profits.
Eventually, subsidy on both qualities improves social welfare.
Effects of R&D Subsidy on Quality Differentiation
For the effect of government R&D subsidy on quality differentiation, expression (20) 
Lemma 1:
The government R&D subsidy to lower quality firm increases the degree of quality differentiation whereas subsidy to higher quality firm decreases the degree of quality differentiation.
Imposition of Uniform R&D Subsidy Policy
Let us assume that government in some cases imposes uniform scale of subsidy (i.e. s s s H L   say) on both qualities of two firms. Then, equilibrium quality outcomes and the welfare effects of optimal subsidy are calculated using the basic model from expression (20) The social welfare obtained in this setting from equation (25) 
Then,optimal profits from expressions (31) and (32) 
Proposition 3: When a government imposes R&D subsidies uniformly, quality equilibrium outcomes, market shares, firms' profits and welfare in subsidized market are always increasing.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The implications of government R&D subsidy investments improve the product qualities of the firms. The study has drawn some key remarks from the entire analysis such as; First, it has proved that R&D distinct subsidies on quality demanded depends on the firms' strategic relationship on their quality decisions where effects of distinct and uniform R&D subsidy on (i) quality differentiation, (ii) producer's profit, and (iii) social welfare, concludes that an R&D subsidy to lower quality firm increases its own profit but decreases the high quality firm's profits. However, subsidy to higher quality firm increases both firms' profit. Eventually, subsidy on both qualities improves the social welfare. Second, in the extended model with uniform subsidy case; producers receives more profits in which welfare maximizing strategy shifts the focus of government policy to enhance welfare by modifying the behavior of the firms.
